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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY
-I"""'."""'E""'D=I"""N"""'O"""F"""'.-"F"""'!~C~E':"Y
STATE OF GEORGIA

CVI COMPANY, LTD.,
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CAMPBELL, JERRY L. BARTH, and
EDWARD O. BARTH,
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)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiffs,

v.
CT RESTAURANTS, LP, CHURCH'S TEXAS
HOLDINGS, LLC, and CAJUN OPERATING
COMPANY, d/b/a CHURCH'S CHICKEN®,
Defendants.

t;~~~~~o~;J

oEpu~ul~5~KJJ\r~~oA;foum

Civil Action File
No.2007-CV-144012

ORDER ON CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Counsel appeared before the Court on May 21 , 2008, to present oral argument
on Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed February 27, 2008, and Defendants'
Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, filed April 14, 2008. After having reviewed the
record of the case, the briefs submitted on the motions, and the arguments of Counsel,
the Court finds as follows:
FACTS
This action arises from the January 8, 2007, Asset Purchase Agreement ("APA")
between the Plaintiffs (collectively, "CVI") and the Defendants (collectively "Church's).
CVI owned and operated ten (10) Popeyes restaurant franchises in Texas pursuant to
CVl's franchise, guaranty, and development agreements with AFC Enterprises, Inc.,
d/b/a Popeyes Chicken & Biscuits ("Popeyes"). Church's is a competitor of Popeyes.

The Negotiations
On or about November, 2006, CVI and Church's entered into a series of
negotiations whereby CVI would sell the assets of its ten (10) Popeyes restaurants to
Church's.1 During the negotiations Church's sent CVI a proposed letter of agreement
on December 7,2006, which CVI executed on December 11,2006. In the letter of
agreement CVI represented that it had unilateral authority for the transaction, and that
neither Popeyes' authorization nor its consent was required to consummate the deal.
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Additionally, CVI made certain representations and warranties that the sale would not
conflict with or breach CVl's franchise or other agreements with Popeyes.
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CVI also

agreed to indemnify Church's from any losses Church's incurred resulting from CVI's
breach of these representations and warranties.
would survive the execution of the APA.
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Additionally, the letter agreement

5

Pursuant to the terms of the letter agreement, CVI and Church's executed the
APA on December 28,2006, thereby consummating the transaction, which closed on or

1 Church's did not purchase the franchise agreements.
2 In §1 "Certain Representation, Confirmations and Warranties of Seller" CVI represented that "[T]he execution,
delivery, and performance of each of the Seller Transaction Agreements by Seller will be authorized and
approved by all necessary action on the part of CVI. .. and no consent, approval, authorization, or action by
AFC Enterprises, Inc. is required in connection with the execution and delivery by CVI. .. or the consummation
by CVI , .. of the transactions contemplated therein."
3 In §1, CVI also represented that the Transaction would not "conflict with, result in a breach of, or constitute a
default under any franchise agreements to which CVI ... is a party or by which it or any Restaurants' assets
may be bound."
4 "3. Agreement of Seller to Indemnify Church's. CVI agree[s] to indemnify Church's from ... all Losses ...
resulting from or based upon: (1) the breach of any of the representations and warranties of Seller set forth in
Section 1; ... ".
5 "4. Effect. This Agreement constitutes a binding agreement between the parties and shall survive the
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about January 9,2007. As it did in the letter of agreement, CVI again made
representations and warranties in the APA that CVI had full authority to enter into and
to consummate the transaction without consent from Popeyes.
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CVI also made

representations and warranties that the transaction would not breach nor conflict with
any agreements to which CVI was a party or by which any of the assets might be
bound.?
Section 5 of the APA set forth the indemnity provisions whereby CVI would
indemnify Church's. In pertinent part Section 5 provides:
5. Indemnification
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For the purposes of this Article 5, the terms "Loss"
and "Losses" shall mean any and all demands,
claims, actions or causes of action, assessments,
losses, damages, liabilities, costs, and expenses
including without limitation interest, penalties, and
reasonable attorneys' and other professional fees and
expenses.
5.1 Agreement of Seller to Indemnify Purchaser.
Subject to the terms and conditions of this Article 5,
Seller, General Partner and Shareholders, jointly and
severally, hereby agree to indemnify, defend, and hold
harmless Purchaser from, against and in respect of
any and all Losses asserted against, relating to,
imposed upon or incurred by Purchaser by reason of,
execution of the Purchase Agreement. ... ".
6 In §3.2 "Authority" CVI represented it "has full power and authority to enter into this Agreement. .. and to
consummate the Transactions contemplated hereby and thereby."
7 In § 3.3 "Execution and Delivery" CVI represented that "[N]o consent, approval, authorization, or action by any
third party... is required in connection with the execution and delivery by Seller. .. or the consummation by
Seller... Neither the execution and delivery by Seller, ... nor the consummation by Seller... will ... (iii) conflict
with result in a breach of, or constitute a default under any ... agreement or other instrument to which Seller...
is a party or by which it or any of the Assets may be bound."
8 Section 5 also provided that CVI would indemnify Church's for (ii) the breach of any covenant or agreement
made pursuant to the APA, and (iii) the Excluded Liabilities, and (v) liabilities arising from CVl's termination of
CVI's employees. These provisions are not at issue here.
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resulting from or based upon:
(i) the breach of any representation or
warranty of Seller General Partner of the
Shareholders contained in or made Pursuant to this
Agreement or any Seller Transaction Agreement;
[emphasis added] [and]
(iv) any act by AFC Enterprises, Inc. in
connection with the Sale of the Business to
Purchaser; and ... [emphasis added.]

Section 6.5, "Escrow" provided that the parties would execute an escrow
agreement whereby $250,000.00 of the sales proceeds would be placed in escrow
"for 90 days following the completion of the closing of the transactions contemplated by
the Asset Purchase Agreement to satisfy certain claims Purchaser may have against
Seller.... " Section 2(b)(ii) of the escrow agreement provided that the escrow money
would be disbursed to CVI unless within ninety (90) days after closing, Popeyes
initiated a legal action against Church's regarding the Transaction. Section 9.6
"Integration of Agreement" provided that the APA, the letter of agreement, and the
escrow agreement were integrated and superseded all other prior agreements.

The Popeyes Action
Subsequent to the consummation of the sale Church's closed all ten (10) of the
former Popeyes restaurants and reopened six (6) of them as Church's restaurants. On
or about February 28,2007, Popeyes filed suit against CVI and Church's in State Court
of Fulton County (the "Popeyes Action,,). 9 Popeyes alleges that CVI breached its
franchise, guaranty, and development agreements and misappropriated trade
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secrets.
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Popeyes also alleges that Church's induced CVI to breach these

agreements, thereby tortiously interfering with Popeyes' business and contractual
relations.
CVI's Action For Declaratory Judgment And Church's Counterclaim

On February 28,2007, pursuant to the asset purchase documents, Church's
notified CVI that it would seek indemnification for all losses incurred resulting from the
Popeyes Action.
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On July 2, 2007, CVI authorized the distribution of $8,875.00 from

the escrow account to Church's "without waiver" in defense of the Popeyes Action.
However, on December 13, 2007, CVI filed this action for declaratory judgment
asserting that CVI was not obligated to indemnify Church's in any way as a result of the
Popeyes Action, and that CVI was entitled to the balance of the escrow monies.
Church's filed a counterclaim for breach of contract, indemnification, and fraud. It
alleges that CVI willfully misrepresented that it had unilateral authority for the
transaction, and that the transaction would not breach or conflict with CVl's franchise
(or other) agreements with Popeyes. Pursuant to the indemnity provisions in the letter
of agreement and the APA Church's claims that CVI is obligated to indemnify it for all
losses it incurs as a result of the Popeyes Action.
On February 27, 2008, CVI filed its motion for summary judgment for declaratory

9 AFC Enterprises, Inc. d/b/a Popeyes Chicken & Biscuit v. Cajun Operating Company d/b/a Church's Chicken,
et aI., Civil Action File No. 2007 EV 001961 (State Court of Fulton County, State of Georgia)
10 Popeyes alleges its franchise agreements with CVI allowed only the operation of the facilities as Popeyes
restaurants and prohibited change of name, brand, and sale of franchises without express written consent of
Popeyes; Popeyes also alleges it had the right of first refusal for a proposed sale of the ten (10) franchises.
11 In this communication, Church's stated it was seeking indemnification based on the APA § 5.1 (iv.) On
November 26,2007, Church's sent correspondence to CVI stating it was seeking indemnification pursuantto §
5.1 (iv) and § 5.1 (i) of the APA.
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relief urging this Court to rule that CVI has no indemnity obligation to Church's resulting
from the Popeyes Action, and that the remaining $238.239.91 escrow money (now
deposited in the registry of the Court) be released to CVI. Church's filed its response
and cross motion for partial summary judgment on April 14, 2008, arguing that CVI is
obligated to indemnify Church's for all of its losses arising out of the Popeyes Action,
but moving this Court to rule on the narrow issue that Church's is obligated to indemnify
CVI for its reasonable attorneys fees, costs and expenses in defending the Popeyes
Action. Church's also moves the Court to rule that it is entitled to the escrow monies,
and that CVI is obligated to pay any litigation expenses in excess of these funds.
STANDARD
To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the movant must demonstrate that
"there is no genuine issue of material facts, viewed in the light most favorable" to the
non-movant, "to warrant judgment as a matter of law." Lau's Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga.
491 (1991), O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56(c). Construction of a contract is a matter of law for the
court particularly where the terms are unambiguous. It is thus a matter peculiarly well
suited for adjudication by summary judgment. Castellana v. Conyers Toyota, Inc., 200
Ga. App. 161, (1991). In determining the parties' respective motions, this Court has
considered the indemnity provisions in §§ 5.1 (i) and 5.1 (iv) of the APA and the related
provisions in the letter and escrow agreements.
Indemnity Liability Under The Asset Purchase Agreement § 5.1 (iv)
CVI asserts it has no indemnity obligation to Church's pursuant to §5.1 (iv) of the
APA. It argues that the language of § 5.1 (iv) only obligates CVI to indemnify Church's
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for losses resulting from an act by Popeyes in connection with the Transaction, but not
for Church's own tortious acts as alleged in the Popeyes Action. Therefore, CVI
argues, the plain, unambiguous language of § 5.1 (iv) does not obligate CVI to indemnify
Church's for any claims arising from the Popeyes Action, including attorneys fees and
litigation expenses.
CVI further argues that even if this Court finds a contractual basis for indemnity
liability under § 5.1 (iv) of the APA, allowing Church's to be indemnified for its own
intentional tortious conduct is contrary to Georgia public policy. CVI admits there are
no Georgia cases on point in regard to indemnification for intentional torts. It
analogizes indemnity for intentional torts to indemnity for negligence and looks to
Georgia as well as to other jurisdictions.

12

CVI argues that Georgia courts consistently

have held that it is against public policy to indemnify a party for its own negligence in
the absence of express language providing for this. See Service Merchandise Co .. v.
Hunter Fan Co .. 274 Ga. App. 290, (2005). CVI also propounds the Hunter Court's
reasoning that an indemnification contract must be strictly construed against the
indemnitee. Finally, CVI cites to other jurisdictions for the proposition that it is would
be contrary to Georgia's public policy to indemnify Church's for its own intentional
tortious conduct.
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Thus, even if this Court finds that the APA or other document

requires CVI to indemnify Church's for its own intentional tortious conduct, such a

12 Cornell v. Council of Unit Owners Hawaiian Village Condominiums Inc., 983 F. Supp. 640 (D. Md. 1997);
City of Montgomery v. JYD Intern .. Inc.! 534, So.2d 592 (Ala. 1988); DeKalb County v. Lenowitz. 218 Ga. App.
884 (1996); Morris v. McDonald's Corp.,650 N.E.2d 1219 (Ind. App. 1995); Lake Cable Partners v. Interstate
Power Co., 563 N.W. 2d 81 (Minn. App. 1997).

13 Eguitex, Inc. v. Ungar, 60 P.3d 746 (Colo. Ap. 2002); Lincoln Logan Mut.lns. Co., v. Fornshell, 722 N.E. 2d
239 (III. App. 4 Dist. 1999); Larson v. Van Horn, 313 N.W. 2d 288 (Mich. App. 1981); Biondi v. Beekman Hill
House Apartment Corp., 257 AD. 2d 76 (N.Y.A.D. 1 Dept. 1999); Solis v. Evins, 951 S.W. 2d 44 (Tex. App.
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provision is void as a matter of Georgia's public policy. In the alternative, CVI moves
this Court for a continuance to determine the reasonableness of Church's attorneys
fees and litigation expenses.
Church's argues that the clear, unambiguous language of § 5.1 (iv) expressly
provides that CVI shall indemnify Church's for all losses - including reasonable
attorneys fees, costs and expenses incurred by Church's resulting from "any act" by
Popeyes in connection with the transaction. Under Georgia law, if an agreement
contains unambiguous language, the court gives the language its plain meaning. See
In re Lummus Dev. Corp., 85 F.3d 575, 577 (11

th

Cir. 1996). The Popeyes Action,

Church's argues, clearly is "any act" by Popeyes, which is directly grounded upon,
arises out of and relates to said transaction.
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Furthermore, Church's argues, the parties anticipated a lawsuit by Popeyes and
provided an indemnity obligation for that very scenario as evidenced by § 5.1 (iv) of the
APA. In addition, the parties agreed that the monies in the escrow account could
only be released to CVI if Popeyes did not file suit within ninety (90) days of the
closing pursuant to the escrow agreement.
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That agreement also provided that if

Popeyes filed suit against Church's CVI would instruct the escrow agent to pay
Church's pursuant to those claims, and on July 2,2007, CVI authorized the escrow
agent to pay Church's $8,875.00 for accrued attorneys fees and costs in defending the

Corpus Christi 1997).
14 See Church's Cross Motion For Partial Summary Judgment, '22. page 8.
15 Section 9.6 of the APA integrated and incorporated the escrow agreement. Section 2(b )(ii) of the escrow
agreement provided that the escrow money would be disbursed to CVI unless within ninety (90) days after the
closing, Popeyes initiated a legal action against Church's regarding the transaction.
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Popeyes Action. Church's concludes that there is no genuine issue of fact regarding
CVl's obligation to pay for Church's attorneys' fees and costs in defending the
Popeyes' Action. Church's further argues that a continuance is unnecessary because
the Court should first determine CVl's liability for these expenses and then determine
the reasonableness at a later date.
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Analysis Of The Indemnity Liability Under § 5.1 (iv)
"The construction of a contract is a question of law for the court." O.C.G.A. § 132-1. Where the terms of a written contract are plain and unambiguous, the construction
of that contract is a question of law for the Court rather than for the jury. Gilreath v.
Argo, 135 Ga. App. 849, (1975). If the contract language is clear and unambiguous,
the court enforces the contract according to its terms. Simpson v. Pendergast, 290 Ga.
App. 293, (2008).
It is clear from the plain, unambiguous language of § 5.1 (iv) that the parties
expressly contracted for CVI to indemnify Church's for any losses, including attorneys
fees and costs of litigation Church's might incur related to "any act by [Popeyes] in
connection with the sale of the Business." Under "§ 5. Indemnification, the terms
'''Loss,' and 'Losses' shall mean any ... claims, . .. and causes of action ... including
... reasonable attorneys' and other professional fees and expenses." The Popeyes
Action was a direct result of CVl's sale of its assets to Church's, and is "in connection
with the sale of the Business." Thus the Court finds that the Popeyes Action is clearly

16 Church's also states that there is a separate indemnity issue regarding CVI's obligation to indemnify
Church's for CVI's alleged breaches of representations and warranties pursuant to the letter agreement and §
9

an "act" by Popeyes within the plain, unambiguous meaning of the words.
In interpreting all contracts, the court's fundamental goal is to find and give
effect to the true intent of the parties, and where the contract terms are clear and
unambiguous, the court looks to that alone to find the parties true intent. Southern
Federal Sav. And Loan Ass'n. of Atlanta v. Lyle, 249 Ga. 284, (1982). "It is axiomatic
that a contract should be construed by the court where the language is undisputed but
the meaning of that language is in dispute." Board of Regents of University System of
Georgia v. A.B. & E., Inc., 182 Ga. App. 671, 673, (1987). "In that case, if the words
are plain and clear in their common usage even though the meaning is in dispute, it is
the duty of the court to look to this language in order to effectuate the intent of the
parties." lQ. The language of the escrow agreement further shows the parties' intent
to indemnify Church's for losses it might suffer as the result of litigation by Popeyes,
because it expressly provides for monies to be held in escrow for the express purpose
of defending Church's from a possible lawsuit by Popeyes.
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Additionally, fact that CVI

instructed escrow funds to be released to Church's to pay litigation expenses further
demonstrates the parties' intent to indemnify Church's for a suit brought by Popeyes.
The Court is not persuaded by CVl's public policy argument. First, Church's
claim for indemnification of its attorneys fees and litigation expenses arises from "an
act" by Popeyes, not from Church's own actions, which have only been alleged and not

5.1 (i) of the APA. This indemnity issue will be discussed infra.
17 Section 2(b )(ii) stated that if within 90 days after the closing "AFC Enterprises, Inc [Popeyes] ... initiates a
lawsuit or any other legal action against Purchaser... with respect to the transactions contemplated by the
Asset Purchase Agreement (a "Proceeding") then Purchaser shall instruct Escrow Agent to retain the Second
Holdback Amount in escrow together with the Holdback Amount." Additionally, the word, "Proceeding" is
encompassed by the broader term, "act."
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proven to be tortious. Second, the negligence cases to which CVI cites all involve
personal injury or severe property damage, not mere allegations of business tortS.18
D.C.G.A. §13-8-2 (b) specifically states that indemnity for negligence is against public
policy in cases where bodily injury or property damage is caused by the indemnitee's
negligence. Thus, Georgia's public policy against indemnifying a party for negligence
absent an express provision applies mainly to cases dealing with bodily injury or
property damage, and is not applicable in the case at bar.
Likewise, the cases from other jurisdictions to which CVI cites for the proposition
that it is against public policy to indemnify a party for its intentional torts are no more
persuasive.

First, they have no precedential effect in Georgia, and more importantly,

they all deal with egregious and/or criminal behavior by the indemnitee, not allegations
of tortuous interference between competitors.
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In summary, the Court finds that § 5.1 (iv) is not against Georgia's public policy.
Accordingly, this Court finds that the clear language of the APA and escrow agreement
require CVI to indemnify Church's for its reasonable attorneys fees, costs, and other
litigation expenses incurred in defending the Popeyes Action.

Indemnification Liability Under § S.1Cil Of The APA
Both the letter agreement and § 5.1 (i) of the APA provide that CVI will indemnify

18 Service Merchandise Co. v. Hunter Fan Co., 274 Ga. App. 290 (2005); Cornell v. Council of Unit Owners
Hawaiian Village Condominiums Inc., F. Supp. 640 (D. Md. 1997)(dealingwith bodily injury); City of Montgomery
v. JYD Intern .. Inc .. 534, So.2d 592 (Ala. 1988)(regarding bodily injury); DeKalb County v. Lenowitz. 218 Ga.
APP. 884 (1996)(dealing with continuing nuisance and damage to property); MorriS v. McDonald's Corp.,650
N.E.2d 1219 (Ind. App. 1995)(dealing with bodily injury); Lake Cable Partners v. Interstate Power Co., 563 NW.
2d 81 (Minn. App. 1997)(dealing with death).
19 Eguitex. Inc. v. Ungar, 60 P.3d 746 (Colo. Ap. 2002)(dealing with criminal theft); (Lincoln Logan Mut. Ins.
Co.! v. Fornshell, 722 N.E. 2d 239 (III. App. 4 Dist. 1999)(dealing with murder); Larson v. Van Horn, 313 N.W.
2d 288 (Mich. App. 1981)(dealing with conversion of property).
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Church's for its losses incurred as the result of eVl's "breach of any representation or
warranty" CVI made in the APA, the letter agreement or the escrow agreement. CVI
claims that the representations and warranties provided for in these documents only
relate to CVl's ability to consummate and close the sale, that Church's received 100%
of everything for which it contracted, and that Popeyes has not asserted any adverse
claims against the assets Church's bought. CVI argues that it has not breached a
representation or warranty and is under no obligation to indemnify Church's for its
intentional tortious conduct, and is therefore entitled to summary judgment on this
issue.
Church's argues that in addition to CVl's indemnity obligation pursuant to §
5.1 (iv) of the APA and the escrow agreement, CVI is also obligated to indemnify it for
any "losses" due to eVI's express breaches of the clear and unambiguous
representations and warranties contained in the letter agreement and in §§ 3 and 5.1 (i)
of the APA. Church's alleges that eVI breached the representations and warranties
that it had full authority to enter into the transaction, that it did not need Popeyes's
consent, and that the transaction would not conflict with or breach CVI's franchise and
other agreements with Popeyes. Church's claims that these breaches resulted in
whatever potential liability it has to Popeyes.
Because no determination has been made in the Popeyes Action regarding
whether Church's is liable to Popeyes, and so questions of fact remain as to whether
Church's suffered any losses due to CVI's alleged breaches. Church's argues that any
indemnity obligation arising under § 5.1 (i) involves unresolved material issues of fact,
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and that CVl's motion for summary judgment is premature and should be denied,
pending final adjudication of the Popeyes' Action.
Analysis of § 5.1 (i) Arguments
"The construction of a contract is a question of law for the court. Where any
matter of fact is involved, the jury should find the fact." O.C.G.A. §13-2-1. Summary
judgment is only appropriate when no genuine issues of material fact remain. Evans v.
Sparkles Management LLC, 659 S.E. 2d 860, 861 (Ga. App. 2008). This Court finds
that genuine issues of material fact remain regarding both: (1) whether CVI breached
its representations and warranties in the letter agreement and in §§ 3.2 and 3.3 of the
APA, resulting in liability under § 5.1 (i); and (2) whether these alleged breaches
resulted in any losses to Church's, including losses incurred pursuant to the Popeyes
Action. Since neither issue has been adjudicated, the Court finds that these
unresolved questions of material fact preclude the grant of summary judgment.
CONCLUSION

The Court hereby GRANTS Church's motion for partial summary judgment on
the issue of reasonable attorneys fees, costs, and expenses of litigation in defending
the Popeyes Action. The Court DENIES CVl's Motion For Summary Judgment.
Counsel shall appear before this Court to present evidence and argument on the fees,
costs, and expenses accrued and their reasonableness, at a later time. Church's shall
contact the Court to schedule such hearing within thirty (30) days of the date of this
Order.
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50 ORDERED thislT day of June, 2008.

ELiZAB TH E. LONG, SENIOR JUD
For ALI E D. BONNER, SENIOR J
GE
Superior Court of Fulton County
Atlanta Judicial Circuit
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